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SLIDE 1
SUCCESS OF THE SPACE STATIONPROGRAM WILL BE MEASURED BY
HOWWELL IT ADDRESSESTHE BASIC REQUIREMENTSFOR:
1) MAINTAINING THE ORBITING SPACE STATION FREEDOM FULLY
OPERATIONAL FOR ITS PROJECTED LIFE OF THIRTY YEARS
". 2) THE COST-EFFECTIVEEXECUTION OF THE OVERALL SPACE
STATIONPROGRAM.
THE DEGREE OF SUCCESSWILL DEPEND ON HOWEFFICIENTLY WE
ALLOCATE, USE, AND MAINTAIN ONORBIT SYSTEMSAND RESOURCES
AND HOW SUCCESSFULLYWE AVOIDWASTE OF RESOURCES,TIME,
AND DOLLARS. WE CAN'T RISK HAVING COMPLEX ONBOARD
SYSTEMS IN AN UNCERTAIN STATE OF HEALTH AT ANY TIME THEY
t,o MAY BE NEEDED. NEITHER CANWE AFFORD TO PROVIDE TWENTY
FOUR HOUR PER DAY GROUND BASEDSURVEILLANCEOF THE HEALTH
OF ONBOARD SYSTEMSFOR THIRTY YEARS. THE ACCUMULATED
DOLLARCOST FOR MAIN'IENANCEOF THE NECESSARY SPECIALIZED
GROUND BASED FACILITIES AND STAFF FOR THE THIRTY YEARS
" WOULDBE ENORMOUS.
THE ONLY SOLUTION IS A PROPER BALANCE OF THOROUGH AND
COMPLETE ONBOARD TESTING CAPABILITIES WITH SUPPORTING
GROUNDBASEDMONITORINGRESOURCES AND ACTIVITIES.THE
EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESSOF THOSE CAPABILITIES AND THAT
GROUNDBASED SUPPORTWILL DETERMINETHE SUCCESS OF THE
OVERALL SPACE STATION PROGRAM.
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SLIDE 1
BACKGROUND
BASICREQUIREMENTSOF THE SPACE STATIONFREEDOM(SSF)
• EXPECTED30 YEAR CO.NT!NUOUSONORBIT OPERATION OF SYSTEMS
• EFFICIENT ONORB1T UTILIZATIONOF SYSTEMS
to
o_ - SYSTEMFUNCTIONS MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR USE
WHNg_
- EFFICIENTALLOCATION AND USE OF RESOURCES IS
MANDATORY
• EFFICIENTBALANCEBETWEENON'BOARDAND GROUNDMONITORINGCAPABILITIES
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ONBOARD SYSTEM HEALTH ASSESSMENTMUST PROVIDECOMPLETE
AND THOROUGH TESTING CAPABILITIES ALONG WITH EFFECTIVE
ASSOCIATED REDUNDANCY/FAULT MANAGEMENT. THESE
CAPABILITIES MUST BE SUPPLIED FOR ALL FUNCTIONS AND
INTEGRATED COMBINATIONS,FROM THE ORU LEVEL TO THE
ULTIMATE OVERALL MULTI-SYSTEM END-TO-END SSF
CONFIGURATION. THE CAPABILITIES WILL BE SOME COMBINATION
OF AUTOMATEDREDUNDANCYAND STRINGRECONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT, BUILT IN TEST/BUILT IN TEST EQUIPMENT
(BIT/BITE) AND DIAGNOSTICS, ALONG WITH A VARIETY OF
t,o SPECIALIZED ON ORBIT END-TO- ENDTESTS. CREW/GROUND¢.,vl
'_ MANAGEMENT OF THESE CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCES MUST
BE DIRECTED TO ENSURE THAT ALL ONBOARD SYSTEMS, THEIR
CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE AND PROPERLY
FUNCTIONAL WHEN THEY ARE NEEDED. THAT MANAGEMENT MUST
BE _ RECOGNITION OF THE FOLLOWING BASIC CONSTRAINTS:
1) HEALTH ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES MUST NOT CONFLICT OR
OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
2) THEY MUST BE DESIGNED TO AVOIDUNREASONABLE DEMANDS
FOR CREW PARTICIPATION.
3) THE SYSTEMS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES MUST BE
DESIGNED FOR THE EASY ACCOMMODATIONOF ADDITIONSAND
MODIFICATIONS TO THE SSF SYSTEMS AND CONFIGURATION(S).
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WHAT IS ONBOARD SYSTEM HEALTH ASSESSMENT?
• SCOPE
- REDUNDANCYMANAGEMENTAND STRINGRECONFIGURATION
- B IT/BITE/DIAGNOSTICS
- END-TO-ENDONORB1TCHECKOUT
to
¢dl
o, - CREW/GROUNDMANAGEMENT
• PURPOSE
ENSURETHATEACHONBOARDSYSTEMISAVAILABLEANDFUNCTIONSPROPERLYWHEN
SLIDE 3
THE CHALLENGE : TO KEEP ALL ONBOARD SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL
FOR THE FULL TERM OF THE PROJECTED THIRTY YEAR LIFETIME
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING UNIQUE AND UNUSUAL CONDITIONS
AND CONSTRAINTS:
(l) THE INITIAL FULL ASSEMBLY OF THE SPACE STATION FREEDOM
(SSF) WILL ONLY OCCUR ONORBIT AND WILL PROVIDE THE
FIRST
OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT AN END-TO-END TF.ST OF ITS FULLY
INTEGRATED COMPLEX OF SYSTEMS OR TO TEST ITS SYSTEMS
IN
THE REAL OPERATIONAL AND FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT.
ALL SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENTS, ADDITIONS AND
UI_RADES MUST ALSO OCCUR ONLY ONORBIT. THERE WILL BE
"BACK TO THE GROUND "FOR CONFIRMATION OF THEIR PROPER
INCORPORATION OR THAT THEY FUNCTION PROPERLY. THAT
CAN ONLY BE BY WAY OF ONBOARD TESTING
1,o
o3
O_ (2) THE CREW MUST BE CONTINUALLY ASSURED THAT EVERYTHING
IS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND THAT ALL SYSTEM RESOURCES
ARE OR WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED. OTHERWISE,
THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO WORRY ABOUT THE STATUS OF THEIR
EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL IMPACT THEIR EFFICIENCY.
(3) ONORB1T HEALTH ASSESSMENT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH
MINIMAL IMPACT ON NORMAL OPERATIONS, ONLY REASONABLE
DEMAND FOR CREW PARTICIPATION AND WITHOUT
INTERFERENCE TO CRITICAL FUNCTIONS OR IMPORTANT ONGOING
ACTIVITIES,
(4) A THIRTYYEARLIFEOF GROWTHAND CHANGEMUSTBE
ANTICIPATED.THATGROWTHWILLINCLUDEUPGRADESAND
ADDITIONSTO INCREASEEFFICIENCY,CAPACITYAND SCOPEOF
CAPABILITIES.PROVENNEW TECHNOLOGyWILLBE
INCORPORATEDINTO THE SSF AS ITBECOMESAVAILABLE.
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CHALLENGES AND ISSUES
ACCOMPLISHING, WITH MINIMAL IMPACT ON NORMAL OPERATIONS AN REASONABLE
DEMANDS FORCREWPARTICIPATION,THE FOLLOWING:
• MAINTAIN ONBOARD SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL FOR 30-YEAR SSF LIFETIME
• NO RETURNTO GROUNDFOR MAINTENANCEOR OVERHAUL
bO
• REPLACEMENTS, ADDITIONS,AND UPGRADES ONORBIT ONLY
• ONBOARDCAPABILITYTO ASSURE CREW THAT SYSTEMSARE FUNCTIONINGPROPERLY AND
SYSTEMRF_OURCES ARE AVAILABLEAS NEEDED
•ACCOMMODATECONTINUEDSYSTEMGROWTHANDFREQUENTCHANGESINSTATION
CONFIGURATIONANDSOFTWARE
SLIDE 4
THE PROBLEM OF ARRIVING AT THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF HEALTH
ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY IS MULTI-FACETED. THE FOLLOWING ARE
SOME OF THE PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES.
(1) CURRENT FUNDINGAND SCHEDULE CONSTRAINTS PREVENT EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF THE "IDEAL SSF ONBOARD
HEALTH ASSESSMENT SYSTEM". SOME CAPABILITIES REQUIRED
FOR THAT "IDEAL" SYSTEM ARE BEING DEFERRED TO GROUND
MONITORINGWHILE OTHERS ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERED ONLY
POTENTIALS FOR GROWTH.
(2) R/D OF APPLICABLE TECHNOLOGIES IS FOCUSED ON PROBLEMS
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE SSF.
o_ THEY GENERALLY FAIL TO RECOGNIZE PROPERTIES THAT ARE
UNIQUE TO THE SSF PROGRAM, SUCH AS ITS THIRTY YEAR STAY
IN ORBIT WITHOUT RETURN TO EARTH, ITS COMMITMENT TO
TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH AND ITS CHANGEABLE TIME
CRITICALITY.
,(3) THERE HAS BEEN AND STILL IS, THE PROBLEM OF GETrING
EXPERTISE OF OTHER NASA RESEARCH CEN'IERS TO BEAR ON THE
THE FULLY INTEGRATED MULTI-SYSTEM SSF HEALTH
ASSESSMENT PROBLEM. TO THIS POINT THEIR TENDENCY
HAS BEEN TO FOCUS ONLY ON WORK PACKAGE OR SYSTEM
RESPONSIBILITIES.
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DEFINITION OF PROBLEM
PROGRAMMATICS
• CURRENT FUNDING/SCHEDULECONSTRAINTSPREVENTDESIGN/DEVELOPMENTOF AN IDEAL
SYSTEM.
- CURRENTSSF ONBOARD SYSTEMHEALTH ASSESSMENT IS LIMITED,(LESS THAN
IDEAL).
t,o - SOMECAPABIL1TIF,S HAVE BEENDEFERREDTO GROUNDMONITORING.
¢.jt
€..D
• TECHNOLOGYDEVELOPMENT- IS ISOLATEDFROM REAL WORLD SYSTEMLIMITATIONSAND IS
NOT FOCUSEDON THISPROBLEM.
• UNIQUE PROBLEM - ie 30 YEARS OF OPERATION WITH REPAIR SHOP LOCATED THOUSANDS OF
MILES AWAY.
• DIFFICULTYINGETI'INGEXPERTISEOF OTHER NASA RESEARCH CENTERSTO BEAR ONTHE
PROBLEM.
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UNDER THE CURRENT SSF DEVELOPMENT PLAN THE ONBOARD
HEALTH ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS WILL DEPEND ON THE STATE
OF SSF DEVELOPMENT. THE REQUIRED ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
WILL GROW FROM BARE MINIMUM FOR PMC (PERMANENTLY
MANNED CONFIGURATION) TO THOSE FOR A SUBSTANTIAL SYSTEM
WITH A FAIR AMOUNT OF AUTOMATION AT AC (ASSEMBLY
COMPLETE). FROM AC FORWARD ( MATURITY AND GROWTH), THE
REQUIREMENT WILL BE TO GROW ONBOARD HEALTH ASSESSMENT
CAPABILITIES IN SCOPE EFFICIENCY AND AUTOMATION, ADOPTING
NEW APPLICABLE TECHNOLOGY AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. THE
DIFFERENCES IN THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE THREE STATES OFto
o_ DEVELOPMENT ARE SIGNIFICANTAND DESERVE DEEPER
CONSIDERATION. LETS LOOK AT EACH IN TURN.
NOTE: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PMC AND AC ARE MADE OBVIOUS
IN THE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT JSC 31000. ITS
STATEMENTS OF REQUIREMENTS ARE ACCOMPANIED BY
DESIGNATIONS AS TO WHETHER THEY ARE TO BE ENFORCED AT
PMC OR AC.
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SSF HEALTH ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS
• REQUIREMENTSDIFFERDEPENDINGON STATEOFSSF DEVELOPMENT
- SOMEREQUIREMENTSHAVE BEENDEFERREDFROM PMC (PERMANENTLYMANNED
CONFIGURATION)TO AC (ASSEMBLY COMPLETE)
- MANUAl_/GROUND FOR PMC
- AUTOMATIC/ONBOARD WITH GROUND SUPPORT FOR AC
• STATES OFSSF DEVELOPMENT
- PMC
-AC
- MATURITY/GROWTH
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UNDER THE CURRENT SSF DEVELOPMENT PLAN, AT PMC ONLY A
BARE MINIMUM OF ONBOARD HEALTH ASSESSMENT ASSOCIATED
CAPABILITIES WILL BE AVAILABLE. THE ONLY ASSOCIATED
AUTOMATION IS THE FAULT DETECTION,ISOLATION AND RECOVERY
(FDIR) PROVIDED FOR CRITICALITY 1 ( CREW SAFETY CRITICAL)
FUNCTIONS. FOR THOSE, THE FDIR IS TO THE ORU LEVEL AND
REDUNDANCY SWITCHOVERS ARE AUTOMATIC. ASIDE FROM THAT,
THE ONLY ONBOARD ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH HEALTH
ASSESSMENT AND MAINTENANCE IS THE ACQUISITION OFt'o
o_ DIAGNOSTIC DATA, THEIR TRANSFER TO THE GROUND FOR ANALYSISto
AND ASSESSMENT AND CREW INITIATED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
DIRECTEDFROM THE GROUND. THE PRIMARY CONTROL FOR THOSE
ACTIVITIES IS FROM THE GROUND BASED OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT GROUND APPLICATION (OMGA) WITH CREW SUPPORT.
THE DATA ACQUIRED ONBOARD AND ISSUED TO THE GROUND ARE
DIAGNosTIc DATA DERIVED FROM INSTALLED BIT/BITE ALONG
WITH DMS, REDUNDANCY AND CONFIGURATION STATUS DATA.
THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE OF THIS METHODOLOGY IS THE GROUND
BASED TIER 1 CONTROL.
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PMC
• MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS
- FAULTDETECTION/ISOLATIONTO ORU FOR CRITICALITY 1 FUNCTIONSONLY .
- AUTOMATED RM FOR CRITICALITY 1 (SAFETY CRITICALS) ONLY
• PRIMARYCONTROLFROM GROUND (OMGA)WITH CREW SUPPORT
bO
- ASSOCIATEDCREW ACTIVITY IN RESPONSETO GROUND DIRECTION
• METHODOLOGY
- DIAGNOSTICSCOLLECTEDONORB1TVIA BIT/BITEAND TRANSMITIED TO GROUND
FOR ANALYSIS AND FAULT DIAGNOSIS (JSC 31000 Par. 3.1.19.3)
- CREW/GROUNDDIRECrED RECONFIGURATIONSTO REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS (NOT
AUTOMATIC) (JSC 31000 Par. 3.1.8.7.1)
- CONFIGURATIONAND REDUNDANCY STATUSDATA ARE SENT TO THE
GROUND (SIGNIFICANTOMA FUNCTIONALITYDEFERREDTO OMGAFOR PMC)
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AT AC THE PRIMARY (TIER 1) CONTROL SHIFTS FROM THE OMOA TO
THE ONORBIT OMA (OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT APPLICATION),
WITH OMGA AND CREW IN SUPPORTING ROLES. SYSTEM AND INTRA-
SYSTEM CONTROL WILL BE BY LOWER TIER (SYSTEM) MANAGEMENT.
ALSO AT AC, THERE WILL BE THE CAPABILITY FOR FAULT
DETECTION/ISOLATION TO THE.ORU LEVEL, WITH REDUNDANCY AND
ALrrOMATED REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT EXPANDED TO COVER ALL
SAFETY AND MISSION CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. THE INITIAL AC
HEALTH MONITORING AND MAINTENANCE CAPABILITIES WILL BE
THOSE FOR SATISFACTION OF BASELINE OPERATIONAL SSF
REQUIREMENTS. THEY WILL INCLUDE FULLY AUTOMATED FDIR FOR
t,o HIGH LEVELS OF CRITICALITY (CREW SAFETY AND MISSION) ANDO')
'_ BIT/BITE CAPABLE OF FAULT DETECTION/ISOLATION TO THE
ORU/ORU INTERFACE LEVEL. DMS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH
AUTOMATED FDIR AND RM AND CONFIGURATION STATUS
MONITORING AND LOGGING WILL BE AUTOMATED. PRIOR TO THIS,
DMS ONLY SUPPLIED DIAGNOSTICS, STATUS AND CONFIGURATION
DATA. THESE WILL BE THE PROPERTIES AND FEATURES OF THE
BASELINE OPERATIONAL SSF HEALTH ASSESSMENT SYSTEM.
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AC
/
/
/
• SATISFIES BASEJ.,INEOPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
- FAULT DErEL_ION/ISOLATION TO THE ORU/ORU'S INTERFACING
SYSTEM / SOFTWARE (JSC 31000 PAR. 3.1.8.3.1)
- EXPANDEDREDUNDANCYAND AUTOMATED RM FOR SAFEFY AND MISSION
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS - EXPANDED ROLE OF BIT/BITE (INTRA/INTER-SYSTEM
TESTING)
bO
o_ • PRIMARY GLOBAL CONTROL IS OMS (OMA) WITH OMGA/CREW SUPPORT
- LOWERTIER CONTROL FOR INTER/INTRA SYSTEM
• MEII4ODOI.IX3Y
- AUTOMATEDFDIRFOR HIGHLEVELS OF CRITICALITY
- BIT/BITEFOR FAULTDETECTION/ISOLATION TO ORU/ORU INTERFACE
- CAPABILITYFOR ON-DEMAND AUTOMATED STATUSCHECKS
- DMS PROVIDED WITH AUTOMATED FDIR (JSC 31000, PAR. 3.3.2.6.2)
- AUTOMATED CONFIGURATION/RM STATUSMONITORING/LOCK]ING
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SUMMARY OF THE DIFFERENCES
Reference PMC Requirement AC Requirement
_'U Par. (page(s))
ill
m 3.1.5.4 0nboard/ground operations Design for autonomous operations for aU7
,_ (3-10/11) sequencing override capability TBD period with sequencing override
_3 capability
"u3>
_3 3.1.8.3.5 automatic FDIR for criticality 1 only automatic RM with status to ground,
m (3-17) RM/RM status to crew/ground crew and other automated applications
uff
f.-
:_ 3.1.8.7.2 automatic RM reconfiguration for Onorbit automation for elimination of2
:_ (3-25) safety criticals only - others are need for realtime continuous monitoring
2 manual (crew/ground) by SSMB ground personnelO
--t t,o
3.1.24.2.2 overall control by OMGA with crew control by OMA with crew/ground
(3 -86/87 ) s uppor t support
Ili
U7 3.1.24.3..4.8 Primary recovery mode for station Primary recovery mode is automatic
(3-9) wide functional failures is with manual support
manual/ground process with limited
[i_ au tom ation
3.3.2.2.1.2 Single DMS network (core) Double DMS network (corelpayload)
_- (3-134)
3.3.2.3.1.2.8 Fault •Detection and reconfiguration by Fault management and reconfiguration
_:_ (3-167 thru 3-169) O1_ by OMA
k_ 3.3.2.3 Primary control by OMGA Primary control by OMA
:_ (3-154 thru 3-190)
__-_
:":' * NOTE - List of some of the major differences.
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SUBSEQUENT TO AC, THE REQUIREMENT WILL BE FOR A CONTINUAL
EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE ONBOARD HEALTH ASSESSMENT
CAPABILITIES. THAT EFFORT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ACHIEVE
TOTAL RELIABILITY, COMPLETE END-TO-END SSF COVERAGE AND
TOTAL AUTONOMY OF HEALTH ASSESSMENT. THE ULTIMATE GOAL
SHOULD BE TO PROVIDE AN ONBOARD HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND
MAINTENANCE SYSTEM HAVING ALL THESE PROPERTIES THAT WILL
FUNCTION WITH MINIMUM DEMAND FOR CREW ATI_NTION. THIS
GOAL SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THROUGHOUT THE LONG
to OPERATIONAL LIFE OF THE SSF. AS APPLICABLE NEW
oo METHODOLOGIESARE DEVELOPEDAND TECHNOLOGIESARISE, THEY
SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE ONBOARD SYSTEMS TO
ENHANCE THE HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND MAINTENANCE
CAPABILITIES. THIS SHOULD BE AN ONGOING ACTIVITY, SINCE THAT
CAPABILITIES EVOLUTION PROCESS WILL PROVIDE DEFINITION FOR
USE IN OTHER PROGRAMS INVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEMS WITH
LONG OPERATIONAL LIFES.
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MATURITY/GROWTH
• REQUIREMENTIS FOR CONTINUALENHANCEMENTSAIMEDAT:
- INCREASED RELIABILITY
- INCREASEDCOVERAGE
- I_F_SSENINGDEMANDSON CREW
_o - INCREASEOF SSFAUTONOMY
tD
-END-TOENDAUTOMATIONFHEALTHSURVE_CE ANDMAINTENANCE
(IDEALEEDGOAL)
• METHODOLOGY(IF.S)???
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REASONABLE SATISFACTION OF THE SSFHEALTH ASSESSMENT
REQUIREMENTS AT PMC, AC, AND BEYOND CAN BE ENSURED THROUGH
EARLY RECOGNITION OF BASIC NEEDS IN SYSTEM DESIGN.
THAT DESIGN MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD EFFECTIVE USE OF THE
CREW. IT MUST PROVIDE AN EFFICIENT AND RELIABLE ONBOARD
SYSTEM HEALTH ASSESSMENT/MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY TO
ENSURE CONTINUAL CREW CONFIDENCE IN THEIR EQUIPMENT.
EXERCISE OF THAT CAPABILITY MUST BE WITHOUT ADVERSE
IMPACT ON NORMAL OPERATIONS OR THE DEMAND FOR THE
UNREASONABLEUSE OF ONORBIT RESOURCES.DEVELOPMENT OF
t,o PROPER DESIGN/METHODOLOGY REQUIRES COMPLETE AND CLEAR
"_ DEFINITION OF THE OVERALL HEALTH ASSESSMENT PROBLEM AND
ITS REQUIREMENTS AT PMC, AC AND BEYOND. A PLENTIP'IJL SUPPLY
OF HOOKS AND SCARS WILL BE REQUIRED FOR ITS PROGRESSIVE
IMPLEMENTATION. THIS IS A TOUGH DESIGN PROBLEM THAT
DEMANDS A WIDESPREAD COOPERATIVE ATTACK FOR PROPER
SOLUTION.WE NEED BE'ITER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS
NASA CENTERS AND WE NEED TO INVOLVE ACADEMIA AND
INDUSTRY RESEARCH. THE POTENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSFERRABLE NEW TECHNOLOGY ALONG WITH THE CHALLENGE
PRESENTED BY THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE ATTRACTIVE INDUCEMENTS
FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF THOSE NON-NASA GROUPS.
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HOW DO WE GET THERE ?
• EARLYRECOGNITIONOFTHEBASICNEEDS
- MOST EFFECTIVEUSE OF CREW
- MOST EFFECTIVEUSE OF ONORB1TTIMF/RFSOURCES
- MORECOMPLETEANDCLEARDEFINITIONOFTHE PROBLEM
- PLENTIFUL SUPPLY OF HOOKS AND SCARS
-.o
• WIDESPREADATFACK OFTHE PROBLEM
- COOPERATIVEATI'ACK-NASACENTER-TO-CENTER,ACADEMIA
ANDINDUSTRYR/DEFFORTS
- SIGNIFICANTVIA POTENTIALFOR TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFERTO OTHER PROGRAMS
-TECHNOI.E)GICALADVANCES AND NEW TF_LS-INOLOGY
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THE FOLLOWING ARE RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACK OF THE SSF
HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND MAINTENANCE PROBLEM
(1) ADOPT AND ENFORCE THE POLICY OF "DESIGN TO TEST". THIS
APPROACH HAS PROVEN MOST EFFECTIVE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TESTING AND HEALTH ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES FOR LARGE
AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS.
(2) MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE BASIC DESIGNOF THE SSF SYSTEMS
INCORPORATES A PROPER AND PLENTIFUL SUPPLY OF SOFTWARE
"HOOKS" AND HARDWARE "SCARS" TO ACCOMMODATE FUTURE
• _ GROWTH AND EXPANSION OF HEALTH ASSESSMENT TECHNOLOGY
t,o AND CAPABILITIES.
(3) STIMULATE INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM THROUGHOUT ALL NASA
CENTERS AND NON-NASA RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS.
(4) APPLY APPROPRIATE NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEM AND MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR SELECTION.
ENTERTAIN OUTGROWTHS OF PROVEN DEVELOPMENTS.
AND THE PROSPECT OF COMBINING THE BEST FEATURES OF
VARIOUS TECHNOLOGIES. AVOID A METHODOLOGY THAT LEADS
TO "LOCK IN" TO A GIVEN TECHNOLOGY AND ADOPT ONE THAT IS
•ADAPTABLE TO GROWTH AND CHANGE.
• . . . .
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RECOMMENDATIONS
• PROMOTEANDENFORCEDESIGN/DEVEI_PMENT REQUIREMENTFOR"
- DESIGN TO TEST
- INCORPORATIONOF HOOKS/SCARSTO ACCOMMODATEEXPANDED
CAPABIL1TIF_,SffF.,CHNOLOGICALGROWTH
* EXPANDARENAOF PROBLEMRECOGNITION
-.o
e.,o
- ALL NASA CENTERS
- ACADEMICRESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS
- INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH CENTERS/ORGANIZATIONS
• APPLYAPPROPRIATENEWTECHNOLOGIESTO OUR PROBLEM
- OUTGROWTHSOFPROVENDEVELOPMENTS
- TECHNOLOGYCOMBINATIONS(ASSEMBLIESOF BEST FEATURES)
SLIDE 11
FOR THE OPERATIONAL SSFWE NEED THE CONTINUAL ONBOARD
CAPACITY TO ENSURE CREW AND MISSION SAFETY, OPERATIONAL
READINESS AND SUFFICIENTPERFORMANCE RESERVES TO COPE WITH
ANY UNFORESEENEMERGENCY THROUGHOUTTHE ONORBIT LIFEOF
THE SSF. WE NEED A COMPLETE AND RELIABLE ABILITY TO
EFFECTIVELY COPE WITH ANY FAULT OR FAILURE. WE NEED THE
ONORBIT ABILITY TO VERIFY THAT ALL REPAIRS, REPLACEMENTS,
UPGRADES AND ADDITIONS INTRODUCED TO THE OPERATIONAL SSF
ARE PROPER AND CORRECT. WE NEED THE ONORBIT ABILITY TO
CONDUCT THE TESTINGNECESSARY TO ESTABLISHFULL CONFIDENCE
IN THE EQUIPMENT AT ANY TIME. WE NEED THE ONORBIT ABILITY
.-1 TO BE ASSURED THAT THAT ONBOARD TESTABILITY IS RELIABLE
AND EFFICIENT.
'q ,, \
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WHAT DO WE NEED?
• ABILITYTO ISOLATEFAULTSAND FAILURESTO AN ORU - 100%.
• ABILITY TO ISOLATE FAULTS & FAILURES TO THE CARD OR SRU (FOR CERTAINCARDS ie
EDP)- 90%.
• ABILITY TO RECOVER FROM ALL FAULTS (TRANSIENTS OR PERMANENT).
• ABILITY TO WORK AROUND FAILURES.
to
.-,,.1
• ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT S/W UPGRADES & CHANGES ARE INSTALLED PROPERLY AND
PERFORMAS EXPECTED.
• ABILITYTO CONFIGURE SYSTEM FOR TESTING DURING GROUND OPERATIONOR "ON DEMAND".
• ABILITY TO VERIFY SYSTEM/STATION CONFIGURATION/RECONFIGURATION & MODING AT
ANYTIME.
• ABILITYTODOTESTRESULTSPREPROCESSINGONBOARDTOREDUCETEI.EMEIRY/GROUND
SUPPORTBURDEN.
• NEWDESIGNSUTILIZF/FF.STABIL1TYOOLSDURINGDESIGN/DEVELOPMENTPHASETO ENSURE '
ONORBITTESTEFFICIENCY.
SLIDE 12
CONSIDERINGTHESCOPE OF THE PROBLEM,THEREAPPEARS TO BE NO
EXISTINGTECHNOLOGYTHAT, TAKEN ALONE, CAN SATISFY ALL OUR
REQUIREMENTS. THE PRIME CANDIDATES, AUTOMATED KNOWLEDGE
BASED AND EXPERT DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS, APPEAR INADEQUATE AT
THEIR CURRENT LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT. THIS IS ALSO TRUE FOR TH
CONVENTIONAL BIT/BITE. ONE PROBLEM WITH THESE IS THAT THE
FOCUS OF THEIR DEVELOPMENTS TO THIS TIME HAS HAVE BEEN
GENERALLY LIMITED TO LOW LEVELS OF ARCHrI'ECTURE
(REPLACEABLE UNITS AND SUBSYSTEMS). A SECOND PROBLEM IS
THAT MOST HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DIAGNOSTICS FOR
AFFER- THE- FACT, IN-SHOP USE. OUR REQUIREMENT IS FOR THE
ADDRESS OF FULL AND INTERSYSTEM FAULT/FAILURE
MANAGEMENT ONORBIT. THE DEMAND IS FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY
THAT, PERHAPS BUILDS ON THESE EXISTING ONES, BUT THAT HAS
ADDED SCOPE AND CAPABILITIES. THE INCORPORATION OF ONBOARD
SOFI'WARE SIMULATIONS AND MODELS INTO KNOWLEDGE BASED
EXPERT SYSTEMS APPEARS TO BE ONE A'Iq'RACTIVE POSSIBILITY.
DESIGN TO TEST OF SYSTEMS (SYSTEM LEVEL BIT/BITE AND
DIAGNOSTICS) IS A SECOND. FINALLY, WHAT ABOUT AN ONBOARD
COMPUTER DEDICATED TO SYSTEM/INTER-SYSTEM TESTING ?
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FOOD FOR THOUGHT
• POTENTIALTECHNOLOGY
- ONBOARDUSEOFSOFrWARESIMULATIONSANDMODELS
- EXPERTSYSTEMS
- KNOWLEDGEBASEDAUTOMATEDSYSTEMS
t,o
,.-3
-.l - RULEBASED
- MODEL BASED
- OTHERS
- SYSTEMLEVELBIT/BITE/DIAGNOSTICDESIGN
- NEED.FORDEDICATEDONBOARDTESTCOMPUTER?
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LET ME EXPAND A BIT ON THE NOTION OF INCORPORATING MODELS
AND SIMULATIONS INTO KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS. WHY IS
THAT POSSIBILITY SO ATI'RACTIVE ? FIRST THEY WILL BE READILY
AVAILABLE ( DEVELOPED, AND GROWN TO MATURITY IN THE
GROUND BASED IT&V PROGRAM). SECONDLY THEIR ONBOARD USE IS
DEMANDED TO BYPASS CRITICAL FUNCTIONS DURING INTEGRATED
TESTING. FINALLY, A GREAT DEAL OF DESIGN KNOWLEDGE IS
NATURALLY EMBEDDED IN THOSE MODELS AND THEY CAN BEbO
•..1 EF'FECI'IVELYEMPLOYED TO GROW KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THEIR USEOo
TO PROVIDE STANDARDS FOR PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS.
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CRITERIA FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOR
FOR FUNCTIONAL SYSTEMS AND COMPLEXES OF SYSTEMS WILL BE
DIFFICULT, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, TO DESCRIBE COMPLETELY AND
ACCURATELY IN THE SYMBOLIC FORM REQUIRED BY CONVENTIONAL
KNOWLEDGE BASES. THIS IS TO SUGGEST THAT SOFI'WARE
SIMULATIONS AND MODELS CAN BE EFFECTIVELY USED FOR THAT
PURPOSE. THEY CAN BE EMPLOYED IN PARALLEL WITH REAL
SYSTEM OPERATIONS TO PROVIDE STANDARDS FOR PERFORMANCE
COMPARISONS. THOSE STANDARDS MAY BE OF IDEAL PERFORMANCE
FOR THE MONrI'ORING OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE OR MAY BE
SPECIALIZEDFORTESTINGCONDUCTEDTOACQUIREDIAGNOSTICS
SHOULDTHATPERFORMANCEPROVETO BE OUT OFTOLERANCE. SUCH
USES WILL YIELD VALUABLE KNOWLEDGEREGARDING SYSTEMbO
oo PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS. THEY MAY ALSO BE
EMPLOYED FOR "WHAT IF" STUDIES TO EXPAND KNOWLEDGE
REGARDING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOR. FOR EXAMPLE,
THEY MAY BE MANIPULATED TO SIMULATE SOME FAULT, FAILURE
OR OFF NOMINAL CONDITION TO ESTABLISH SYSTEM HEALTH
EVALUATION CRITERIA.
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THE ON'BOARD CAPABILITIES MUST PROVIDE FOR APPROPRIATE
RESPONSES TO ONBOARD TESTING. THESE MUST INCLUDE THE
ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY ANALYZE TEST RESULTS THEN TO TAKE
APPROPRIATE ACTION(S). IF THE RESULTS DON'T INDICATE A
PROBLEM, NORMAL OPERATIONS ARE MAINTAINED. IF THERE IS AN
INDICATED FAULT OR FAILURE ADDITIONAL TESTING MUST BE
DONE, FIRST TO RULE OUT "FALSE ALARMS" THEN TO DERIVE A
PROPER SET OF DIAGNOSTICS. SHOULD IT BE A FALSE ALARM,
NORMAL OPERATIONS ARE RESUMED WITH INCREASED
SURVEILLANCE OF THE SUSPECTED TEST SUBJECT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) ARE TAKEN (RM SWITCHOVER,
WORK-AROUND RECONFIGURATION, REPAIR/REPLACEMENT). IF THEt,o
oo TEST RESULTS INDICATE ONLY PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION, NOTbO
FAULT/FAILURE, THEN ACTIONS TO COUNTER THE PERFORMANCE
DEGRADATION ARE IN ORDER. THESE MAY BE ADJUSTMENTS OF
SYSTEM CONTROLS OR ACTIVITY SCHEDULES OR THEY MAY BE OF A
DIFFERENT NATURE, BUT MUST BE DIRECTEDAT RESTORING THE
NOMINAL PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY. FOLLOWING ANY
CORRECTIVE ACTION, IT MUST BE VERIFIED TO BE COMPLETE AND
PROPER BEFORE ITS SUBJECT IS RESTORED TO NORMAL OPERATIONS.
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